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Many recent copyright infringement cases have focused on the question of 
volition.  As contentious as the matter has become in current copyright doctrine, the 
issue is relatively new.  From the passage of the first Copyright Act in 1790 forward, 
U.S. copyright cases devoted no discussion to the issue.  Two centuries later, 
however, the advent of the Internet raised this issue, among so many others. 
Nothing is totally new under the sun.  As far back as enactment of the 1976 Act, 
concern was expressed lest telephone companies be ensnared in liability, to the extent 
that their facilities were used in the retransmission of cable signals.1  Congress 
adopted the “passive carrier” exemption, releasing from liability those “whose 
activities with respect to the secondary transmission consist solely of providing 
wires, cables, or other communications channels for the use of others.”2  That 
provision was necessary as telephone companies risked liability in its absence.3  
Nobody at the time raised lack of “volition” as even a theoretical defense to that 
imputation.  Decades later, with the advent of the Internet and online services, those 
same considerations multiplied along with the explosion of new ways to use “wires, 
cables, or other communications channels.” 
I. NETCOM 
A. NOVEL RULING 
The “granddaddy” case here is Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line 
Communication Services, Inc.  Plaintiffs owned the copyright to the writings of L. 
Ron Hubbard, controversial founder of the Church of Scientology.  Defendant 
Dennis Erlich, a former Scientology minister “turned vocal critic of the Church, 
whose pulpit is now the Usenet newsgroup alt.religion.scientology,”4 posted to the 
 
 1. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING REGIMES COVERING 
RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS (1997), https://perma.cc/AS4L-97Q4. 
 2. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (2018). 
 3. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 1, at x (“This provision was intended initially to ensure 
that telephone companies, whose wires and hardware were used as a conduit for the retransmissions made 
by cable systems, would not somehow be deemed to be infringers under the new Copyright Act of 1976.”). 
 4. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1365 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
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Internet long verbatim quotes from Hubbard, followed by brief editorials of his own, 
often of a sarcastic nature.5  Plaintiffs responded by suing not only him, but also 
Thomas Klemesrud, operator of the Bulletin Board Service (BBS) that serviced 
Erlich.  They also sued Netcom, Inc., then one of the country’s largest Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs), which provided the facilities linking that BBS to the 
Internet.6  Before instituting suit, plaintiffs had demanded of defendants that Erlich 
be defrocked from their systems, but “Netcom contended that it would be impossible 
to prescreen Erlich’s postings and that to kick Erlich off the Internet meant kicking 
off the hundreds of users of Klemesrud’s BBS.”7  Under the undisputed facts, 
Netcom’s software was such that “Erlich’s initial act of posting a message to the 
Usenet results in the automatic copying of Erlich’s message from Klemesrud’s 
computer onto Netcom’s computer and onto other computers on the Usenet.”8 
A handful of cases decided shortly before Netcom had confronted parallel issues, 
ruling in favor of the copyright owner without the necessity of showing that the 
defendant had any knowledge of the copyright—after all, the elements of copyright 
infringement require a plaintiff to prove only its ownership of the work in question 
and the defendant’s exercise of one of the owner’s exclusive rights.  Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, for instance, held liable the operator of a BBS accessible 
to customers via modem over the telephone lines, by which those customers could 
obtain high-quality digital photographs to which plaintiff owned the copyright.9  The 
decision did not delve into anything related to the defendant’s volition.  Sega 
Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA shut down a BBS that overtly “encouraged [users] to 
download Sega games therefrom to avoid having to buy video game cartridges from 
Sega.”10 
Acting as an outstanding common law judge confronting an evolving technology, 
Judge Whyte refused to be shackled by preexisting doctrine.11  He simultaneously 
acknowledged why traditional principles viewed Netcom, Inc.’s conduct as 
infringing, along with the need under the circumstances to adopt new standards: 
It is not difficult to conclude that Erlich infringes by copying a protected work onto his 
computer and by posting a message to a newsgroup.  However, plaintiffs’ theory further 
implicates a Usenet server that carries Erlich’s message to other servers regardless of 
whether that server acts without any human intervention beyond the initial setting up of 
the system.  It would also result in liability for every single Usenet server in the 
 
 5. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1247 
n.18 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
 6. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1365–66. 
 7. Id. at 1366. 
 8. Id. at 1367. 
 9. 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (M.D. Fla. 1993).  The same plaintiff brought a series of parallel cases, 
in which it largely prevailed.  See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1171, 1173 
(N.D. Tex. 1997); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 505 (N.D. Ohio 
1997). 
 10. 857 F. Supp. 679, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
 11. Nonetheless, Judge Whyte misconstrued one aspect of this case, as this writer has explored 
elsewhere.  See David Nimmer, An Odyssey Through Copyright’s Vicarious Defenses, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
162 (1998) (dealing with whether an indirect defendant can assert its own fair-use defense or only that of 
the directly liable defendant).  That issue is entirely orthogonal to current concerns.  
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worldwide link of computers transmitting Erlich’s message to every other 
computer. . . . Although copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some 
element of volition or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely 
used to create a copy by a third party.12 
Having articulated that public policy, he held: 
Where the infringing subscriber is clearly directly liable for the same act, it does not 
make sense to adopt a rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose role 
in the infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a system that is 
necessary for the functioning of the Internet. . . . Billions of bits of data flow through 
the Internet and are necessarily stored on servers throughout the network, and it is thus 
practically impossible to screen out infringing bits from noninfringing bits.13 
After absolving Netcom, Inc., of direct infringement liability as a matter of law, 
Judge Whyte held that material facts remained to be resolved concerning the 
copyright owner’s theory of contributory liability.14 
B. BUILDING BLOCKS 
In the core part of the decision, Judge Whyte framed the question for resolution 
as “whether possessors of computers are liable for incidental copies automatically 
made on their computers using their software as part of a process initiated by a third 
party.”15  His negative answer to that inquiry hinged on the following elements: 
(1) “It is not difficult to conclude that Erlich infringes by copying a protected 
work onto his computer and by posting a message to a newsgroup.”16 
(2) But the same reason that ensnares a user does not necessarily apply to higher 
level actors:  “Netcom’s act of designing or implementing a system that 
automatically and uniformly creates temporary copies of all data sent through 
it” is analogous to a copy shop.17 
(3) It goes too far to implicate “a Usenet server that carries Erlich’s message to 
other servers regardless of whether that server acts without any human 
intervention beyond the initial setting up of the system.”18 
(4) “There is no need to construe the Act to make all . . . parties, who . . . do no 
more than operate or implement a system that is essential if Usenet messages 
are to be widely distributed.”19 
 
 12. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369–70. 
 13. Id. at 1372–73. 
 14. The basis here was that “it is fair, assuming Netcom is able to take simple measures to prevent 
further damage to plaintiffs’ copyrighted works, to hold Netcom liable for contributory infringement 
where Netcom has knowledge of Erlich’s infringing postings yet continues to aid in the accomplishment 
of Erlich’s purpose of publicly distributing the postings.  Id. at 1375 (emphasis added).  As to those 
italicized words, see infra note 171 and accompanying text. 
 15. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1368. 
 16. Id. at 1369. 
 17. Id.   
 18. Id.  To the same effect, “Netcom’s and Klemesrud’s systems can operate without any human 
intervention.”  Id. at 1368. 
 19. Id. at 1369–70. 
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(5) The bottom-line conclusion is:  “The court does not find workable a theory 
of infringement that would hold the entire Internet liable for activities that 
cannot reasonably be deterred. Billions of bits of data flow through the 
Internet and are necessarily stored on servers throughout the network and it 
is thus practically impossible to screen out infringing bits from noninfringing 
bits.”20 
The above ends the court’s discussion of direct liability.  But there is more to the 
opinion: 
(6) Turning to vicarious liability,21 the opinion concluded, “There is no evidence 
that infringement by Erlich, or any other user of Netcom’s services, in any 
way enhances the value of Netcom’s services to subscribers or attracts new 
subscribers.”22  The same consideration applied to Klemsrud’s BBS.23 
(7) That facet is also relevant to contributory infringement.24  Judge Whyte 
distinguished the facts at bar from Sega v. MAPHIA, which properly held that 
“a BBS operator is liable for copyright infringement where it solicited 
subscribers to upload files containing copyrighted materials to the BBS that 
were available for others to download” when the “defendant solicited the 
uploading of such programs and received consideration for the right to 
download files.”25 
INTERVAL:  VOLITION OR CAUSATION? 
The most influential aspect of Netcom arises out of this sentence:  “Although 
copyright is a strict liability statute, there should still be some element of volition 
or causation which is lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to 
create a copy by a third party.”26  That reference to “volition” has caused 
tremendous ferment.  Its phrasing in the disjunctive (“volition or causation”)27 
yields two possibilities:  (a) volition is an alternative to causation, such that 
either suffices; or (b) the two terms are synonymous, and were simply stated 
repetitiously as a stylistic matter.28  The rest of the opinion repeatedly returns 
 
 20. Id. at 1372–73.  The opinion continued, “Because the court cannot see any meaningful 
distinction (without regard to knowledge) between what Netcom did and what every other Usenet server 
does, the court finds that Netcom cannot be held liable for direct infringement.”  Id. 
 21. On the applicable elements for that theory of liability, see the text accompanying note 65 infra. 
 22. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1377.  
 23. The discussion is as follows:  “[T]here are no allegations that Klemesrud’s fee, or any other 
direct financial benefit received by Klemesrud, varies in any way with the content of Erlich’s postings. 
Nothing in or attached to the complaint states that Klemesrud in any way profits from allowing Erlich to 
infringe copyrights.”  Id. at 1382 
 24. On the applicable elements for that theory of liability, see the text accompanying note 66 infra. 
 25. Netcom, 907 F. Supp.. at 1371 (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 857 F. Supp. 679, 683 
(N.D. Cal. 1994)).  
 26. Id. at 1369–70. 
 27. When the opinion later reverts back to this theme, it sets forth a second reference, likewise in 
the disjunctive:  “There are no allegations in the complaint to overcome the missing volitional or causal 
elements necessary to hold a BBS operator directly liable for copying that is automatic and caused by a 
subscriber.”  Id. at 1381–82. 
 28. A third possibility arises to the extent that “or” is interpreted to mean “and.”  Sometimes, 
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to causation,29 leaving the imputation that volition was adduced simply as an 
alternative locution. 
As summarized in a treatise:  “Viewed in this fashion, Netcom simply stands 
for the unremarkable proposition that proximate causation historically 
underlines copyright infringement liability no less than other torts.”30  In other 
words, circumstances might arise in which a defendant is the but-for cause of 
a given act of infringement, but the chain of causation is too remote to support 
legal responsibility.31 
II. DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 
A. DRAFT BILL 
By 1998, Netcom was among only a handful of cases decided in this sphere.  In 
that year, Congress canvassed those authorities as it considered several bills, 
ultimately resulting in enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.32  An 
essential component of that omnibus legislation was § 512 of the Copyright Act, 
designed to provide safe harbors from copyright infringement liability for online 
service providers.33 
The House Judiciary Committee promulgated an earlier bill that contained only 
one overarching provision and was less than one page long.  The committee 
commented about that draft: 
As to direct infringement, liability is ruled out for passive, automatic acts engaged in 
through a technological process initiated by another.  Thus the bill essentially codifies 
the result in the leading and most thoughtful judicial decision to date:  Religious 
Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, Inc.  In doing so, it 
overrules these aspects of Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, insofar as that case 
suggests that such acts by service providers could constitute direct infringement, and 
 
statutes are finely parsed in that manner.  See In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257, 262 n.9 (4th Cir. 2004).  
As we will see presently, some courts have elevated Netcom to statutory or quasi-constitutional heights.  
See infra note 171 and accompanying text.  In that vein, at least one judge interprets the language to be 
conjunctive rather than disjunctive.  See infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 29. A later portion of the opinion references “the same problem of causation as the reproduction 
argument.  Only the subscriber should be liable for causing the distribution of plaintiffs’ work . . . .”  
Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372 (emphases added).  The same page sets forth two additional occurrences of 
“causing.”  Id. 
 30. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08[C][1] (Matthew 
Bender rev. ed. 2019) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]; see also infra notes 128, 176, 214 and 
accompanying text. 
 31. The discussion below will pose some cases of remote causation breaking the chain.  See infra 
Intermezzo. 
 32. Given the paucity of authority as of 1998, the legislative history cited to only a few decisions:  
Netcom, MAPHIA, and the Playboy cases discussed above.  The only other cases that it cited arose in 
strange postures—one was for unauthorized dissemination over the Internet of a videotape depicting sex 
between Bret Michaels and Pamela Anderson Lee, see Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 
2d 823 (C.D. Cal. 1998); the other was for “clip art” used for and by people in the fire service industry, 
see Marobie-FL, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Fire Equip. Distrib., 983 F. Supp. 1167 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 
 33. For the resulting statutory definition regarding those providers, see infra note 71. 
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provides certainty that Netcom and its progeny, so far only a few district court cases, 
will be the law of the land.34 
That bill would have created immunity whenever “the storage and transmission [are] 
carried out through an automatic technological process, without any selection of that 
material by the provider.”35 
B. ENACTED LEGISLATION 
Nonetheless, that version failed to win enactment.  Instead, after proceeding 
through the House Commerce Committee and then a Joint House-Senate Committee, 
a rival bill passed into law which covered eleven pages, with four separate safe 
harbors rather than the overarching one previously promulgated.36  Accordingly, the 
earlier characterization of “codification” is inapplicable to the final text of the law.37  
It imposes much more than the earlier bill in the way of conditions for eligibility.38  
Over the course of its many pages, § 512 incorporates elaborate provisions for notice 
and takedown, designates agents to receive those notices, provides for 
disqualification when a “red flag” is waving,39 and much more.40 
C. DIFFERENCES FROM NETCOM ELEMENTS 
Let us examine how this enactment affects the elements that underlay Judge 
Whyte’s decision.41  Netcom element (1), holding the direct uploader culpable for 
copyright infringement, remains undisturbed. 
Turning to Netcom element (2), the fact that a system creates copies 
“automatically” can no longer be viewed as negating liability for copyright 
infringement.  Instead, Congress engaged in its own calibrated analysis of how to 
 
 34. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 15 (1998), https://perma.cc/X942-KTPU (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
 35. H.R. 2281, 105TH CONG. § 202 (1998), https://perma.cc/B79U-44HY. 
 36. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2019).  For an analysis of the bill’s progress through these stages, see David 
Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (2002) [hereinafter Nimmer, 
Appreciating Legislative History]. 
 37. As this author has previously written: 
The potential problems are threefold.  First, some features of the final act were completely lacking 
when the Judiciary and Commerce Committees finalized their consideration.  Second, even with 
respect to features of the law that trace their genealogy back to the subject report, the final language 
does not necessarily track.  Finally, even if the language of a given feature does ultimately follow 
through to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the meaning may be different in the context of 
a law containing vastly more provisions than the bill then under consideration.   
Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History, supra note 36, at 925. 
 38. See CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 554 n.* (4th Cir. 2004) (“Unlike the 
earlier version, which would have exempted ISPs unconditionally for direct liability for automatic 
processes, the enacted law requires ISPs to fulfill certain ‘conditions for eligibility’ for the safe harbors.”). 
 39. See infra note 57.  
 40. A discussion of all reported cases arising under 17 U.S.C. § 512 in NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 
supra note 30, ch. 12B, currently runs over 200 pages. 
 41. See supra notes 16–25 and accompanying text. 
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treat automatic copying.  To illustrate, let us examine the caching safe harbor.42  
Rather than viewing non-volitional conduct as a bar at the outset preventing the 
plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case, Congress defined copying that occurs 
“automatically” as a first step that constitutes infringement but also weighs into the 
calculus of this new safe harbor.  Specifically, Congress provided immunity 
assuming that a host of requirements were met:  One among those many factors was 
that the storage be “carried out through an automatic technical process for the 
purpose of making the material available to users of the system or network who . . . 
request access to the material from the” party who posted it.43 
That statutory language is crucial.44  It means that those who engage in an 
“automatic technical process” have satisfied one element to take advantage of the 
caching safe harbor—but they still fail to qualify unless they meet all the other 
elements, including refreshing the cached materials, transmitting hit counts, 
observing standard communications protocols, and so forth.45  To consider an 
“automatic technical process” sufficient by itself to negate liability for copyright 
infringement is to short-circuit the six other requirements that Congress 
painstakingly drafted into the law.46  Instead, those who facilitate access to copies 
through automatic technical processes have committed a prima facie case of 
copyright infringement47—to which the caching safe harbor arises as an affirmative 
defense, if all of its elements are satisfied.48 
Congress was capable of dispensing with all those other ingredients (refreshing 
materials, hit counts, standard protocols, etc.).  Indeed, the heart of the House 
Judiciary Committee’s earlier bill was its immunity for activities “carried out through 
an automatic technological process.”49  However, the full Congress rejected that 
alternative and instead adopted legislation incorporating all the requirements just 
mentioned.  The rejected approach cannot now be adopted as governing law.50 
Netcom element (3) represents the flip side of element (2):  Liability extends not 
to “automatic” activities but only to those involving “human intervention beyond the 
initial setting up of the system.”51  Judge Whyte pronounced that distinction to 
 
 42. 17 U.S.C. § 512(b) (2018). 
 43. 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(1)(C) (2018). 
 44. It bears adding that Congress equally referenced an “automatically technical process” in the 
first safe harbor.  17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(2) (2018).  The tally is therefore that the final legislation uses the 
word “automatic” in two of the safe harbors and omits any comparable reference in the other two.  
 45. 17 U.S.C. § 512(b)(2) (2018). 
 46. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(b)(1)(A), 512(b)(1)(B), 512(b)(2)(A)–512(b)(2)(E) (2018). 
 47. What about Judge Whyte’s “copy shop” analogy in element (2)?  As we will see, the Supreme 
Court later debunked it.  See infra text accompanying note 122. 
 48. If facilitating an “automatic technical process” altogether exonerated a party from liability for 
the prima facie case of copyright infringement, then there would be no cause to reach any affirmative 
defense.  It accordingly renders otiose the subject language in the safe harbor referencing an “automatic 
technical process.”  That construction is to be disfavored.  See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 167 
(2001) (describing court’s “duty to give effect, where possible, to every word of a statute”). 
 49. See supra Part II.A. 
 50. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23–24 (1983) (“When Congress includes 
limiting language in an earlier version of a statute but deletes it prior to enactment of the statute, it may 
be presumed that the limitation was not intended.”). 
 51. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1369 (N.D. 
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address the user-uploaded content at issue in that case.  When Congress codified that 
safe harbor, by contrast, it included no Netcom-like provision making liability 
dependent on human intervention.  Instead, the safe harbor sets forth an affirmative 
defense for service providers who make user-posted material available to the public52 
under specified circumstances that arise independently of “human intervention.”53  
Contrary to Netcom, the legislative history expressly sets forth that Congress 
contemplated liability for copyright infringement, and hence the need to afford an 
affirmative defense, for storing material uploaded by third parties “regardless of 
whether that server acts without any human intervention beyond the initial setting up 
of the system.”54  Specifically, with regard to the linking safe harbor,55 the reports 
singled out Yahoo! as the service that then constituted the Internet’s primary search 
engine, commenting, “Directories such as Yahoo!’s usually are created by people 
visiting sites to categorize them.  It is precisely the human judgment and editorial 
discretion exercised by these cataloguers which makes directories valuable.”56  That 
pronouncement stands in marked contrast with the perspective of Judge Whyte, who 
in 1995 contemplated liability if human intervention was present beyond initially 
setting up the system.  It shows that Congress chose a different expedient in 1998—
it legislated a safe harbor that prevails even in the presence of human intervention 
(unless the circumstances indicate that a “red flag” was waving or that another 
statutorily prescribed feature was present that would sacrifice the safe harbor).57 
As to Netcom element (4), Judge Whyte concluded as of 1995 that it was 
necessary to exonerate from infringement liability those who “do no more than 
operate or implement a system that is essential if Usenet messages are to be widely 
distributed.”58  But when Congress passed the law three years later, it concluded the 
opposite—it decided to add four safe harbors to the statute precisely to protect those 
same operators, who otherwise would be found culpable of copyright infringement: 
[W]ithout clarification of their liability, service providers may hesitate to make the 
necessary investment in the expansion of the speed and capacity of the Internet.  In the 
ordinary course of their operations service providers must engage in all kinds of acts 
that expose them to potential copyright infringement liability.  For example, service 
providers must make innumerable electronic copies by simply transmitting information 
over the Internet.  Certain electronic copies are made to speed up the delivery of 
information to users.  Other electronic copies are made in order to host World Wide 
Web sites.  Many service providers engage in directing users to sites in response to 
inquiries by users or they volunteer sites that users may find attractive. Some of these 
sites might contain infringing material.  In short, by limiting the liability of service 
 
Cal. 1995). 
 52. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2018). 
 53. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(1)(A)-(C), (c)(2)–(3) (2018). 
 54. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369.  That quotation forms the backbone of Netcom element (3).  See 
supra text accompanying note 18. 
 55. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2018). 
 56. H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 58 (1998) (emphasis added); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 49 (1998) 
(emphasis added). 
 57. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2018).  The “red flag” terminology comes from the legislative 
history.  H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 2, at 53 (1998); S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 44 (1998). 
 58. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1369–70. 
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providers, the DMCA ensures that the efficiency of the Internet will continue to 
improve and that the variety and quality of services on the Internet will continue to 
expand.59 
The reference to services “hosting Web sites” that “might contain infringing 
material,” thereby causing those services to “engage in all kinds of acts that expose 
them to potential copyright infringement liability,” reflects a regime that is the polar 
opposite from the one Netcom tried to erect.  In the final order, it is the word of 
Congress that governs. 
In terms of Netcom element (5), considering technology extant as of 1995, Judge 
Whyte understandably did not wish to adopt “a theory of infringement that would 
hold the entire Internet liable for activities that cannot reasonably be deterred.”60  
Given the tools at his disposal, he did not have a way to craft appropriate relief, as it 
was then “practically impossible to screen out infringing bits from noninfringing 
bits.”61  But Congress’s arsenal for crafting relief is incomparably larger than that of 
any judge.  As part of § 512, it legislated an elaborate scheme that includes  
• placing the onus on copyright holders to serve, in minute particulars, 
takedown notices to identify infringing content;  
• placing the onus on service providers to record with the Copyright Office the 
names and addresses of agents authorized to receive those takedown 
notices;  
• allowing affected copyright owners to serve counter-notifications, to the 
extent they wish to contest the allegations of those takedown notices;  
• obligating service providers to react expeditiously to takedown notices in 
order to safeguard copyrighted material, including a “putback” provision in 
the event of a proper counter-notification;  
• mandating the filing of those various notices under penalty of perjury, along 
with new punishments applicable to those who willfully make false 
statements in those notifications and counter-notifications;  
• articulating applicable requirements for courts to issue subpoenas requiring 
services to identify unknown users, so that they can be sued;  
• and on and on.62 
In short, Congress incorporated into § 512 the mechanism, which Judge Whyte 
lacked, “to screen out infringing bits from noninfringing bits.”63  It created the 
framework, which again did not exist in 1995, to deter infringing conduct, precisely 
so that judges would no longer face the unpalatable choice to “hold the entire Internet 
liable for activities that cannot reasonably be deterred.”64  The world of § 512 rotates 
in an entirely different solar system from the one that Judge Whyte inhabited three 
years before the statute’s enactment. 
Moving now to the final Netcom elements, which dealt with indirect liability, 
 
 59. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (emphases added). 
 60. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372; see also supra Part I.B. 
 61. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372–73; see also supra Part I.B. 
 62. An exhaustive analysis is set forth in 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 30, ch. 12B. 
 63. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1373; see also supra Part I.B. 
 64. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1372; see also supra Part I.B. 
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Congress revamped those aspects as well.  Specifically, element (7) concerned 
vicarious liability, the two components of which at common law were financial 
interest in the exploitation of copyrighted materials and the right and ability to 
supervise the infringing conduct.65  Element (8) dealt with contributory infringement, 
the two components of which at common law were material contribution to the 
infringing conduct and knowledge of the infringing conduct.66  Section 512 
judiciously adopted selected ingredients from each of those common law doctrines, 
forfeiting protection for those who “receive a financial benefit directly attributable 
to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and 
ability to control such activity,”67 as well as for those who had actual knowledge of 
the infringing conduct or, failing actual knowledge, proceeded in the face of a “red 
flag.”68 
But there is also a significant difference in the legislation as passed from the 
previous doctrines of indirect responsibility at common law:  In the world in which 
Netcom arose, a defendant charged with indirect liability who defeated either 
component of vicarious liability and contributory infringement prevailed outright.  
By contrast, when § 512 selectively adopted aspects of those common law doctrines, 
it did so in a new form—it provided that they would no longer serve as a complete 
defense, but instead would afford a safe harbor limiting available remedies.  
Accordingly, a defendant who finds shelter under any of the safe harbors is still 
subject to adverse judgment along with limited injunctive relief,69 but is not subject 
to any monetary payment.70 
D.  GOVERNING LAW 
The synopsis set forth above demonstrates that Congress accepted some 
conclusions from Netcom (for example, holding the individual uploader liable), 
modified some (for example, regarding indirect liability), and rejected others (for 
example, the impossibility of screening out infringing bits from non-infringing bits).  
More importantly, it shows that Congress erected its own elaborate and distinctive 
structure to govern in this domain.  As salutary as the early judicial efforts were, 
Congress charted its own course to govern the liability of copyright infringement for 
online service providers that provide access to material uploaded by third parties.71 
Collectively, the legislative departures from Netcom’s ruling in no way imply 
 
 65. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963).  
 66. See Gershwin Publ’g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
 67. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (2018). 
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2018); see also supra note 57. 
 69. The scope of injunctive relief against service providers that qualify for any of the safe harbors 
is highly circumscribed.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(j) (2018). 
 70. Each of the four safe harbors establishes that a qualifying “service provider shall not be liable 
for monetary relief.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (2018). 
 71. The first safe harbor, aimed at transmission, is limited to ISPs.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) 
(2018).  The final three are broader, encompassing both ISPs and OSPs, namely any “provider of online 
services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”  17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2018). 
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criticism of Judge Whyte.  Instead, they reflect that the options open to common law 
judges are few, whereas the tableau on which Congress can craft legislative 
distinctions is vast.  The fine result reached by a district judge in one of the first cases 
to be decided in the field, limited to one set of facts, in no way constrained Congress 
from crafting for the future the best and most comprehensive scheme that it could 
construct for the entire field. 
III. FOURTH CIRCUIT:  COSTAR 
The succeeding decades after the enactment of § 512 witnessed scores of cases 
posing the same basic character types as were present in Netcom:  A copyright owner 
(C) objected to the uploading of its material by a user (U), to an online service 
provider (OSP) connected to the world via an ISP, by which all connected viewers 
(Vs) could access the proprietary material.72  To give the cast of characters distinctive 
initials, C (Religious Technology Center) objected to the uploading by U (Erlich) to 
an OSP (Klemesrud) connected to the world via an ISP (Netcom), by which all 
connected Vs could access the material.  With evolving technologies, the targeted 
OSPs largely evolved from the BBS at issue in Netcom to websites, and ISPs became 
universal, as opposed to the Netcoms and AOLs of earlier times,73 such that every 
large university, corporation, non-profit, government agency, and others afforded 
access to the Internet.74 
To illustrate with prominent examples from the Second and Ninth Circuits, 
Viacom (C) filed suit after various users (U1, U2, etc.) uploaded episodes and clips 
from Family Guy, The Daily Show, and South Park, to YouTube (OSP), by which 
countless individuals (V1, V2, etc.) could watch those works.75  By the same token, 
UMG (C) filed suit after various users (U1, U2, etc.) uploaded recordings by 50 Cent, 
Avril Lavigne, and Britney Spears, to Veoh, Inc. (OSP), by which countless 
individuals (V1, V2, etc.) could listen to those works.76  In those and countless other 
suits, no argument arose based on Netcom’s volition language;77 instead, the parties 
litigated the myriad complex features incorporated into the DMCA’s legislative 
scheme.78 
The exception, during the first decade after the enactment of the DMCA, was the 
Fourth Circuit.  An opinion by Judge Niemeyer cited to the outdated legislative 
 
 72. More precisely than “viewers,” those exposed to Hubbard’s writings were “readers”; in the case 
brought by UMG, cited infra note 76, those individuals were “listeners.”  The first term is used here for 
the sake of uniformity and simplicity. 
 73. But a case from 2017 returns us to the same Usenet as was at issue in RTC v. Netcom.  See infra 
Part VI.A. 
 74. As will be seen below, later plaintiffs focused their fire on OSPs, rather than on ISPs. 
 75. Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 76. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 77. Neither of the foregoing cases cites Netcom or mentions “volition”; at issue in them were such 
issues as whether the “red flag” was waving.  See supra note 57. 
 78. See supra note 40. 
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history from the House Judiciary Committee79 regarding Netcom;80 a later opinion in 
CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., also by Judge Niemeyer, acknowledged that 
error, but continued to proceed as though Congress had codified both Netcom and 
Playboy v. Frena.81  But the important point about those two decisions is that other 
jurisdictions failed to follow the Fourth Circuit’s lead—until the law took a sharp 
turn at the end of that decade.  We reach that 2008 case next. 
INTERLUDE:  VOLITION (A) 
We have seen that Netcom used the locution “volition or causation” to refer 
to the latter—but CoStar reversed the polarity:  Although it mentioned causation 
in passing, the bulk of its analysis inhered in volition.82  That approach enjoys 
some support among commentators, as well.83 
IV. SECOND CIRCUIT 
A. CABLEVISION 
In 2008, the Second Circuit confronted a case falling outside the above framework 
of Internet exploitation; absent any OSP or any user who uploaded material to be 
seen by third party viewers, the court had no occasion to invoke § 512.  Instead, 
copyright owners sued the very cable company that was licensed to rebroadcast its 
television programs over cable channels,84 alleging that the defendant exceeded its 
licensed authority by affording viewers a remote-storage digital video recorder (RS-
DVR).85  That RS-DVR was a digital successor to the analog Sony Betamax, a video 
cassette recorder (VCR) which the Supreme Court determined to be non-infringing 
in its first case interpreting the current Copyright Act.86  But the issues posed in this 
later guise concerned aspects not addressed in that earlier ruling.87 
 
 79. As described above, the ultimate legislation discarded that approach, in favor of the alternative 
approach favored by the House Commerce Committee.  See supra Part II.B.  
 80. ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 620 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 81. CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 553–54 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 82. Id. at 556. 
 83. According to one scholar, “‘volition’ has become an established feature of copyright law 
despite the grumblings of treatise writers.”  Robert C. Denicola, Volition and Copyright Infringement, 37 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1259, 1295 (2016).  But there may be less to this disagreement than meets the eye.  See 
infra note 229. 
 84. Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, Cable News Network, Inc. v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 557 U.S. 946 (2009).   
 85. The Netcom line of cases involved C filing suit after U1, U2, etc. uploaded material to an OSP 
to allow V1, V2, etc. to watch those works; by contrast, in this case, C filed suit against a cable provider 
licensed by C, but who allowed V1, V2, etc. to record individual episodes and themselves watch those 
episodes later. 
 86. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
 87. In the earlier case, the Supreme Court addressed two issues:  indirect liability for a staple article 
of commerce, id. at 434–42, and fair use via time-shifting, id. at 447–56.  In the later case, by contrast, the 
parties stipulated to present neither of those issues, instead limiting themselves to the question of whether 
a prima facie case of direct liability existed.  See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. 
Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, 
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Judge Walker followed the above Fourth Circuit authority to uphold Netcom as 
“a particularly rational interpretation” of general copyright principles.88  Turning to 
particulars, the complaint alleged violation of two rights belonging to the copyright 
owners:  reproduction and public performance.  As to reproduction, the court ruled 
in the defendant’s favor expressly based on a purported absence of volition: 
When there is a dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing instance of 
reproduction, Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the volitional conduct that 
causes the copy to be made.  There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this 
case:  Cablevision’s conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists 
only to produce a copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a 
copy of a specific program. In the case of a VCR, it seems clear—and we know of no 
case holding otherwise—that the operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses 
the button to make the recording, supplies the necessary element of volition, not the 
person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the operator, owns the 
machine.  We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable 
from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer on a different party for copies 
that are made automatically upon that customer’s command.89 
Turning to public performance, Cablevision raised two defenses—the first was the 
same volition argument just considered,90 and the second maintained that any 
performance was private.91  To schematize, the first argument claimed absence of a 
performance, the second that it did not qualify as public.  The Second Circuit 
addressed only the latter,92 which it likewise resolved in the defendant’s favor.93 
B. AEREO 
Media mogul Barry Diller and others studied that decision closely.94  Under their 
 
Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 88. Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131. 
 89. Id. at 131 (emphases added). 
 90. Id. at 126 (“Cablevision contended, however, that the work was performed not by Cablevision, 
but by the customer, an argument the district court rejected ‘for the same reasons that [it] reject[ed] the 
argument that the customer is ‘doing’ the copying involved in the RS-DVR.’”). 
 91. Id. (“Cablevision also argued that such a playback transmission was not ‘to the public,’ and 
therefore not a public performance as defined in the Copyright Act.”). 
 92. Id. at 134 (“We need not address Cablevision’s first argument further because, even if we 
assume that Cablevision makes the transmission when an RS-DVR playback occurs, we find that the RS-
DVR playback, as described here, does not involve the transmission of a performance ‘to the public.’”).  
 93. Id. at 135. 
 94. To quote from another case: 
Plaintiff Barry Diller is a famous businessman and entrepreneur who was once the Chairman and 
CEO of Paramount Pictures Corp. and Chairman and CEO of Fox, Inc., and is now the Chairman 
and Senior Executive of IAC/InterActiveCorp., Expedia, Inc., and TripAdvisor, Inc.  At Plaintiff's 
direction, IAC backed an internet-based broadcast television technology platform offered by a 
company called Aereo, Inc., which offers its service in the New York metropolitan area and may 
expand into Los Angeles….  On the website, Defendants used the graphic of a fit, shirtless man 
holding a drill in one hand. Plaintiff believes the name "Barry Driller" was chosen because of 
Plaintiff's involvement with Aereo's internet broadcasting service; Defendant David even noted in 
a news article that he chose the name as a "homage to a great guy" — i.e., Plaintiff Barry Diller. 
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tutelage, a company named Aereo, Inc., offered the same functionality as 
Cablevision, Inc., to viewers, but over the Internet rather than via cable.  The 
resulting case of WNET v. Aereo, Inc. wended its way back to the Second Circuit.95  
Instead of an RS-DVR, viewers who logged onto Aereo’s website could either take 
advantage of “the ‘Watch’ function” to see the show live or press “the ‘Record’ 
button” in order “to save a copy of the program for later viewing.”96  The ultimate 
results for viewers were the same as afforded by the prior technology. 
At issue in this instance was only the public performance right.97  The panel 
resolved the matter before it on the authority of its 2008 precedent.  The decision ran 
through the analysis of Cablevision at exhaustive length as controlling resolution of 
this case.98  Considering one of the plaintiffs’ argument to distinguish that ruling, the 
majority made a linchpin of its rebuttal the fact that viewers exercise “volitional 
control over how the copy is played.”99  That resolution is scarcely surprising—both 
Aereo and Cablevision involved non-party viewers who pressed a button, which 
efficiently caused the harm about which the plaintiffs complained.100 
INTERMISSION: VOLITION (B) 
How much volition does the law require?  Netcom’s germinal statement 
begins by acknowledging that “copyright is a strict liability statute.”101  We can 
thus envision a spectrum.  At the lowest end is strict liability; from there, 
culpability rises through negligence to wantonness to willfulness, culminating at 
the other end with malice aforethought. 
If the low end requires more than pushing a button—as the Second Circuit 
ruled in both the above cases—then the high end must demand geometrically 
more.  One would thereby imagine that first degree murder via a gun can be 
 
Diller v. Barry Driller, Inc., No. CV 12–7200, 2012 WL 4044732 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2012) (citations 
omitted).   
 95. 712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).  Was molding the technology to fit the Cablevision decision 
visionary craftsmanship or shoddy evasion of the law?  It depends on one’s perspective.  The dissent 
derided Aereo’s so-called “technology platform” as “a sham,” continuing:  “[I]ndeed, the system is a Rube 
Goldberg-like contrivance, over-engineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to 
take advantage of a perceived loophole in the law.”  Id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting).  The Second Circuit 
majority took the contrary perspective.  It can be added that Judge Chin, when sitting as a district judge, 
authored the Cablevision decision below, which the Second Circuit reversed.  In this later case, after his 
elevation, he dissented from the majority’s ruling. 
 96. Id. at 681 (majority opinion). 
 97. Id. at 684–86. 
 98. Id. at 686–94. 
 99. Id. at 692.  A footnote belabors that focus.  After first conceding that “an Aereo user in ‘Watch’ 
mode will often not exercise volitional control over the playback of the program,” it concludes, “that is 
not significant because the Aereo user can exercise such control if he wishes to.”  Id. at 692 n.14. 
 100. A fascinating sidelight is that more Second Circuit judges opposed the Aereo decision than 
supported it—the majority consisted of Circuit Judge Droney and District Judge Gleeson, with Circuit 
Judge Chin in dissent.  Id. at 679.  At the next stage, an additional circuit judge joined the latter’s camp.  
See WNET v. Aereo, Inc., 722 F.3d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 2013) (Chin & Wesley, JJ., dissenting from the 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
 101. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
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committed exclusively by those who physically pull the trigger.  Indeed, as we 
are now dealing with the other end of the spectrum, the requirement may go 
even further—perhaps the defendant must have designed and manufactured 
the gun in question. 
Yet criminal law is precisely to the contrary.  U.S. prisons are filled with 
convicted “murderers” located nowhere near the subject gun or even the crime 
scene—such as those who drove the getaway car for a botched bank robbery, 
in which someone ended up getting shot.102 
The Model Penal Code defines murder as taking place when “it is committed 
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 
of human life.”103  Both Cablevision, Inc., and Aereo, Inc., deliberately 
engineered systems, replete with remotes or apps, designed to facilitate 
unauthorized viewing of third party content.  Transposing the above language 
to the copyright context, they “manifested extreme indifference to the value of 
copyrighted content.”  Without needing to conclude that they thereby satisfied 
the highest level of volition, it should be beyond question that they satisfied the 
lowest level—which is all that even Netcom required. 
In short, the Second Circuit’s holdings in the above cases, by limiting liability 
to the human being who pushes the button, created a more exacting standard 
than actually applies to first degree murder.  It is impossible to reconcile that 
approval with a “strict liability offense.” 
V. SUPREME COURT REVERSAL OF AEREO 
A.  MAJORITY 
The Supreme Court accepted review of Aereo.  At that juncture, both aspects of 
the copyright owner’s rights became live—to prevail, the plaintiffs needed to 
convince the Court that Aereo, Inc., performed their works and that it did so publicly.  
The former matter therefore returns us to the issue, bracketed by the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Cablevision, of whether the defendant service or the viewer is the party 
culpable of infringing the public performance right.  But that question regarding the 
performance right returns us to the coordinate issue in Cablevision under the 
reproduction right, in which Judge Walker pinned all responsibility on the viewer 
who pushed the button, absolving the defendant of liability. 
The Supreme Court reversed.104  To do this, it had to answer both questions 
adversely to the defendant.  Specifically, it concluded not only that the performance 
in question was public,105 but also that “when Aereo merely supplies equipment that 
 
 102. See Fernandez v. State, 730 So. 2d 277, 279 (Fla. 1999) (“Abreu drove a getaway car in which 
he waited a few blocks from the crime scene and then transported the perpetrators to his apartment,” for 
which he “received a life sentence.”). 
 103. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 104. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431 (2014). 
 105. As a subsidiary aspect of whether the matter unfolded “publicly,” the opinion investigated 
whether “Aereo’s subscribers receive performances in their capacities as owners or possessors of the 
underlying works.”  Id. at 448.  In explicating that aspect, the majority invoked a distinction between car 
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allows others [to transmit copyrighted works,] the Act is unmistakable:  An entity 
that engages in activities like Aereo’s performs.”106  That holding is eminently 
reasonable—both Cablevision, Inc., and Aereo, Inc., invested  millions of dollars to 
engineer a system for the express and only purpose of creating copies of television 
programming, the vast bulk of which is subject to third parties’ subsisting copyright 
protection; they furnished to their customers remote controls (Cablevision, Inc.) or 
apps (Aereo, Inc.) outfitted with a button that, when pressed, caused those 
copyrighted works to be exploited.  As such, it is only logical to identify the 
responsible entity as those organizations. 
One must hasten to add that this conclusion does not disturb the Second Circuit’s 
conclusions, in both Cablevision and Aereo, that the home viewers who caused the 
transmission themselves behaved culpably.107  Rather, Justice Breyer ruled for the 
majority that “both the broadcaster and the viewer of a television program ‘perform,’ 
because they both show the program’s images and make audible the program’s 
sounds.”108  But, unlike the two Second Circuit decisions that limited liability to “the 
person who actually presses the button,” it treated those individuals as jointly 
culpable with the corporate service that set up the entire system to facilitate their 
conduct.109 
B. DISSENT 
Justice Scalia dissented.110  He invoked what he termed “a simple but profoundly 
important rule:  A defendant may be held directly liable only if it has engaged in 
volitional conduct that violates the Act.”111  His dissent purported to root the matter 
in both text and precedent.  On the first score, it averred, “This requirement is firmly 
grounded in the Act’s text, which defines ‘perform’ in active, affirmative terms:  One 
‘perform[s]’ a copyrighted ‘audiovisual work,’ such as a movie or news broadcast, 
by ‘show[ing] its images in any sequence’ or ‘mak[ing] the sounds accompanying it 
 
dealerships and valet parking attendants.  Id. at 448–49.  We return below to those aspects.  See infra notes 
228–229. 
 106. 573 U.S.  at 438–39.  It later formulated the matter thusly:  “We conclude that Aereo is not just 
an equipment supplier and that Aereo ‘perform[s].’”  Id. at 444. 
 107. We thereby return to Netcom element (1).  See supra Part I.B. 
 108. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 451.   
 109. Cf. Rebecca Giblin & Jane C. Ginsburg, We (Still) Need to Talk About Aereo: New 
Controversies and Unresolved Questions After the Supreme Court’s Decision, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
109, 127 (2015) (“While Aereo addressed only the public performance right, the majority’s opinion raises 
questions about the continued application of the ‘volition’ standard to the reproduction right.”). 
 110. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that when “subscribers log in, select a 
channel, and push the ‘watch’ button,” the result is that “Aereo’s subscribers perform but Aereo does 
not”).  The majority’s “both/and” ruling is directly to the contrary—which certainly does not exonerate 
those individuals from liability.  Id. at 444 (majority opinion) (noting that viewers “click on a Website” in 
order to “activate[] machinery that intercepts and reroutes [television signals] to Aereo’s subscribers over 
the Internet”). 
 111. Id. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  But cf. Denicola, supra note 83, at 1260 (“Justice Scalia’s 
‘profoundly important rule,’ however, is hardly an accepted bedrock of copyright law.  As Scalia himself 
admitted, the Supreme Court had never previously used the word ‘volition’ in the context of copyright 
infringement.”). 
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audible.’”112  On inspection, that claim fails.  One can show or make audible material 
across the full range of human conduct—it can be done maliciously, willfully, 
recklessly, negligently, accidentally, inadvertently, et cetera.113  There is no textual 
warrant for Justice Scalia’s characterization. 
In terms of precedent, Justice Scalia added:  “Every Court of Appeals to have 
considered an automated-service provider’s direct liability for copyright 
infringement has adopted that rule.”114  As support, he adduced three cases.  One is 
Cablevision, which the dissent cites over a half-dozen times in total; that case is the 
lineal ancestor to the very opinion that the majority reversed, which no longer stands 
as good law for the reasons explored above.115  The other two are CoStar, considered 
above,116 and Fox Broadcasting Co. v. Dish Network LLC.117  Those rulings by the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits, respectively, both embody the same faulty logic as 
Cablevision:  namely, the rejected proposition that only the human being who pushed 
the button incurs liability, not the entity that laboriously constructed the entire system 
to facilitate that copying.118  In sum, although the dissent accurately summarizes past 
cases, none survives the majority’s adoption in Aereo of “both/and” liability. 
C. REJECTION OF COPY SHOPS ANALOGY AND OF “AUTOMATIC” IMMUNITY 
One of the dissent’s bases was the similarity of the defendant’s activities to a copy 
shop.119  It will be recalled that Judge Whyte invoked that analogy to deny Netcom’s 
 
 112. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).  
 113. A search on Google Books shows scores of hits just for the two-word phrase “accidentally 
show.”  The following, contemporary with adoption of the Copyright Act, is typical:  “Caution the 
spectators that they must always be very careful not to accidentally show the torn pieces concealed in their 
hand as they unfold the napkin.”  MARK WILSON, MARK WILSON’S COMPLETE COURSE IN MAGIC 307 
(1975). 
 114. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 453 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 115. Justice Breyer specifically cites Cablevision as the “prior Circuit precedent” on which the 
divided panel below relied.  Id. at 438 (majority opinion). 
 116. See supra note 81. 
 117. 747 F.3d 1060, 1066–68 (9th Cir. 2014).  This case represents a variant of Cablevision, in which 
a cable company that had a licensing relationship with the plaintiff copyright owners exceeded the scope 
of the license when it offered its viewers the opportunity for delayed viewing of the shows that they were 
entitled to see when broadcast live. 
 118. The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in CoStar relies on the proposition that a service provider “who 
owns an electronic facility that responds automatically to users’ input is not a direct infringer.”  CoStar 
Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir. 2004).  “Because LoopNet, as an Internet service 
provider, is simply the owner and manager of a system used by others who are violating CoStar’s 
copyrights and is not an actual duplicator itself, it is not directly liable for copyright infringement.”  Id. at 
546.  Those propositions cannot survive Justice Breyer’s later articulation of “both/and” liability.  
Similarly, the heart of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Fox is that: 
operating a system used to make copies at the user’s command does not mean that the system 
operator, rather than the user, caused copies to be made.  Here, Dish’s program creates the copy 
only in response to the user’s command.  Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that 
the user, not Dish, makes the copy.   
Fox, 747 F. 3d at 1067. 
 119. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 455 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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liability.120  Many of the subsequent opinions have returned to that theme.  The 
judges who exonerated defendants characterized their conduct as analogous to a copy 
shop; correlatively, the judges who concluded the opposite expressly dismissed copy 
shops as convincing analogues.121  The analogy, therefore, possesses no independent 
power; it simply serves to confirm whatever antecedent conclusion has already been 
reached.  In any event, the highest articulation of the copy shop analogy comes in the 
Supreme Court majority’s opinion, which rejects its deployment.122  This aspect of 
Netcom should therefore be considered a dead letter at present. 
Regardless how much of Judge Whyte’s “volition or causation” is required under 
governing law, it is now 100 percent clear that Aereo, Inc., possessed the requisite 
quantum, even though it responded through an automatic process to user requests 
over the Internet with no further intervention of its own.  There is no longer any room 
to vindicate the stance that a service provider’s automatic response to user requests 
places it outside of liability.123 
INTERMEZZO:  CAUSATION 
Given that proximate causation can form part of copyright analysis, the 
possibility exists, even after the Supreme Court’s Aereo ruling, of immunizing a 
defendant for conduct that may have transpired over the instrumentalities it 
owns.  Specifically, for a defendant to have a valid defense that it bore no 
responsibility, the chain of causation would need to be broken.  Some 
hypotheticals illustrate: 
• An over-the-airwaves radio station adopts a classical format, broadcasting 
solely musical compositions written before the twentieth century.  The 
subject music is in the public domain, and there is no performance right in 
the subject sound recordings;124 hence, management has correctly 
concluded that no licenses are required under U.S. copyright law for its 
public performances.  But, one day, armed vandals break into the sound 
booth bearing new releases, which they proceed to play over the air.  In this 
instance, a lawsuit targeting the station’s corporate owner and management 
would fail—the unanticipated crime that unfolded on that day broke the 
chain of causation, such that defendants were not proximately responsible 
 
 120. We revert here to Netcom element (2).  See supra Part I.B. 
 121. The Fourth Circuit invoked the analogy in the same manner as Judge Whyte.  CoStar, 373 F.3d 
at 550 (“When a customer duplicates an infringing work, the owner of the copy machine is not considered 
a direct infringer.”).  District Judge Chin employed the analogy to hold Cablevision, Inc., culpable.  
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 2d 607, 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), 
rev’d sub nom. Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).  
The Second Circuit’s reversal analyzed the same cases from the opposite perspective to conclude that “the 
district court’s analogy is flawed.”  Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 131.   
 122. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 443 (“[T]he dissent’s copy shop argument, in whatever form, makes too 
much out of too little.”). 
 123. As opposed to such an automatic rule, it is still possible that there could be an implicit defense 
in the Copyright Act that applies in certain instances, which service providers could invoke in concrete 
cases.  We consider that aspect below.  See infra note 218. 
 124. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2018). 
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for any infringement that may have ensued. 
• A movie theater shows its patrons only licensed films from its locked 
projection room.  One day, as the projectionist is about to tune to the 
frequency for the day’s licensed Fathom Event, a powerful earthquake 
rocks the building.  As fate would have it, the hapless projectionist’s arms 
flail against the controls, tripping a switch that picks up the “dirty feed” of 
the Super Bowl,125 before he is knocked unconscious.  In this instance, a 
lawsuit targeting the theater’s corporate owner, management, and 
projectionist for public performance of the audiovisual depiction of the 
sporting event would similarly fail—the unanticipated Act of God that 
unfolded on that day likewise broke the chain of causation, such that 
defendants were not proximately responsible for any infringement that may 
have ensued. 
• On a different register, a company establishes an intranet on which to store 
its internal documents. Unbeknownst to the company, hackers defeat its 
robust security and invade the space to set it up as a forum on which to 
store infringing material and make it available to others.  Again, in this 
instance, a lawsuit targeting the company should fail.  The unanticipated 
breach, like the ones set forth above, broke the chain of causation such that 
the company was not proximately responsible for the unanticipated 
infringement that happened to take place over its facilities, without its 
knowledge, cooperation, or expectation. 
VI. DEFORMING APPLICATIONS 
A. PERFECT 10 V. GIGANEWS 
1. Application of Aereo 
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
deliberately provided space for users to upload many millions of copyrighted works 
(including tens of thousands of images belonging to the plaintiff), knowing that 
infringement would take place on its facilities and structuring its service to benefit 
thereby.126  The district court dismissed the complaint at the pleadings stage insofar 
as it alleged violation of the public display and distribution rights; it granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant for violation of the reproduction right.  The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed on all bases—even taking all the allegations of the complaint as true, 
it held that the plaintiff failed to state a cause of action.127 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis in Giganews by emphasizing that volition in 
this context does not refer to an “act of willing or choosing”; rather, it quoted the 
treatise formulation of the “unremarkable proposition that proximate causation must 
 
 125. See Nat’l Football League v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc., 792 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986) (granting 
permanent injunction against St. Louis bars showing “dirty feed” of live football game). 
 126. 847 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 127. Given that the appeal arose from the granting of a motion to dismiss, facts alleged in the 
complaint were presumed to be true.  The appellate decision therefore ruled that Perfect 10’s argument 
“that the district court ‘ignored P10’s evidence’ is irrelevant.”  Id. at 668. 
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exist in infringement cases no less than in other torts.”128  It then exonerated 
Giganews, Inc., of direct infringement based on “the volitional-conduct requirement” 
articulated in Justice Scalia’s Aereo dissent.129 
Given that the rule of law of any case emerges from its majority decision, with 
which a dissent by definition disagrees, that reliance cries out for explanation.  The 
Ninth Circuit explained that the Aereo Supreme Court majority “can be reconciled 
with the volitional-conduct requirement.”130  It proceeded to rule in favor of 
Giganews, Inc., by quoting CoStar’s holding—paraphrasing Netcom—that 
“automatic copying, storage, and transmission of copyrighted materials, when 
instigated by others, does not render an [Internet service provider] strictly liable for 
copyright infringement.”131  Yet Justice Breyer ruled exactly to the contrary—his 
majority opinion held the defendant directly liable for copyright infringement when, 
“in automatic response to the subscriber’s request, . . . Aereo’s system activate[s] an 
antenna and begin[s] to transmit the requested program.”132  In short, Giganews 
followed the trail blazed by a 1995 district court ruling instead of governing Supreme 
Court authority to the contrary.133 
The Ninth Circuit further concluded that judgment in the defendant’s favor 
regarding public-display was required on the basis that, “to the extent that [its 
software] is used to view the infringing images, this is done by the user,” not by the 
defendant.134  Again, it is instructive to compare that status with the Supreme Court’s 
ruling:  Defendant Aereo likewise offered software such that the viewing was “done 
by the user”—but the Supreme Court majority explicitly declined to exonerate it as 
“just an equipment supplier” on that basis and instead held it culpable as a direct 
infringer.135 
In sum, even though the Supreme Court majority did not use the term “volition,” 
it held defendant Aereo, Inc., culpable for copyright infringement notwithstanding 
the Second Circuit’s exoneration of that party based on its purported lack of volition.  
The case ruled that engineering a system and supplying software for its use cannot 
allow a party to sidestep responsibility simply because third parties take affirmative 
steps to commit copyright infringement.  Although those third parties may 
themselves also be culpable,136 Justice Breyer characterized the liability as “both/
and,” not “either/or.”137  By contrast, Giganews reasoned that “to the extent that [the 
 
 128. Id. at 666 (quoting NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 30, § 13.08[C][1]). 
 129. Id. at 666–67. 
 130. Id. at 667. 
 131. Id. at 670 (alteration in original) (quoting [as altered] CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 
F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004)). 
 132. Am. Broad. Cos. V. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 444 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 133. The decision dismissed both the reproduction and public distribution counts of the plaintiff’s 
complaint based on variants of “automatically.”  Giganews, 847 F.3d at 669–70.  
 134. Id. at 668 (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., No. CV 11–7098, 2013 WL 3610706, at 
*2 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2013)). 
 135. Aereo, 573 U.S. at 444. 
 136. To that extent, there is no question that element (1) of Netcom continues to pertain at present.  
See supra Part I.B. 
 137. The Supreme Court ruled that “both the broadcaster and the viewer of a television program” 
infringe.  Aereo, 573 U.S. at 441. 
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defendant’s software] is used to view the infringing images, this is done by the user,” 
and hence exonerated the defendant.138  Those holdings cannot be reconciled. 
2. Application of § 512 
The action in Giganews reverted to Usenet—the same realm that Judge Whyte 
had confronted in Netcom three years before enactment of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act.  Remarkably, however, the Ninth Circuit reached its decision in this 
case without adverting to § 512, the legislation that Congress passed after Netcom 
specifically to regulate this domain.139  Instead, the court hung its hat on volition as 
Judge Whyte had defined it in 1995—notwithstanding Congress’s deliberate choice, 
as explicated above, not to codify his Netcom decision.140 
Giganews’s complaint alleged that “Defendants’ service permits their subscribers 
to search USENET content for specific files.  For example, a user interested in 
finding Perfect 10 works on Defendants’ USENET servers might search for the term 
‘Perfect 10.’”141  Yet the Ninth Circuit exonerated defendants from liability.  To 
appreciate how this course of action runs afoul of governing law, let us return to the 
passage from the legislative history quoted above, in which the Senate explained its 
motivation for passage of § 512: “In the ordinary course of their operations service 
providers must engage in all kinds of acts that expose them to potential copyright 
infringement liability. . . . Many service providers engage in directing users to sites 
in response to inquiries by users.”142 
 Because Congress viewed “directing users to sites in response to inquiries by 
users” as “expos[ing service providers] to potential copyright infringement liability,” 
it legislated the safe harbors of § 512 to protect those service providers who comply 
with its elaborate specifications.  As just quoted from the complaint, Giganews, Inc., 
engaged in precisely that sort of directing users in response to their inquiries.  
Holding it outside of potential copyright infringement liability as a matter of law 
therefore contravenes governing strictures.143 
Moreover, that approach contradicts prior case law within the Ninth Circuit.  
Previous cases considered service providers potentially culpable for copyright 
 
 138. Giganews, 847 F.3d at 668 (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., No. CV 11–7098, 2013 
WL 3610706, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2013)). 
 139. Besides one passing reference, Giganews, 847 F.3d at 664, this Ninth Circuit opinion does not 
even mention 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
 140. See supra Part II.B. 
 141. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., No. CV11–07098, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71349, at *5 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 8, 2013) (citations omitted).  Given affirmance of dismissal at the pleadings stage, both court 
levels accepted as true the allegations of the complaint.  See supra note 127. 
 142. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998); see also supra Part II.C. 
 143. Given how many millions of copyrighted works were allegedly offered through Giganews, Inc., 
its exoneration is at odds with a later Ninth Circuit case holding a geometrically smaller Internet site, 
where users could post celebrity photographs, to answer for copyright infringement and to test the validity 
of its § 512 defense in that regard.  See Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. LiveJournal, Inc., 873 F.3d 1045, 
1058 (9th Cir. 2017).  It is hard to reconcile this later ruling that the photographs at issue necessitated a 
trial with the dismissal without any factfinding of the allegations brought against Giganews, Inc., for its 
use of incomparably more photographs (and other copyrighted material). 
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infringement even if their functionality occurred “automatically,”144 therefore 
proceeding to the essential step of evaluating whether the safe harbor applied.145  By 
contrast, in this instance, the Ninth Circuit exonerated Giganews, Inc. by repeatedly 
noting how the plaintiff’s material was exploited “automatically.”146  That holding 
threatens to render § 512 a dead letter.147 
3. Application of Netcom 
Let us imagine that governing copyright law in the United States is a ruling from 
the Northern District of California in 1995 rather than later legislation and Supreme 
Court rulings.  Even under that supposition, the Ninth Circuit reached the wrong 
result in Giganews, given crucial differences in the facts presented from those 
underlying Netcom.  Recall element (6) addressing vicarious liability148 in Netcom:  
“There is no evidence that infringement by . . . any other user of [the defendants’] 
services, in any way enhances the value of [those defendants’] services to subscribers 
or attracts new subscribers.”149  In the mid-1990s, copyright infringement amounted 
to but a tiny trickle among all the Usenet offerings to which Netcom, Inc., then 
afforded access. 
In Giganews, by contrast, the defendant’s moniker bespeaks the opposite.  
Giganews, Inc., true to its name, offered “25,000 terabytes of copyrighted materials 
 
 144. The facts of Giganews mirror those underlying the famous Napster case in several particulars, 
including the following:  “By using a ‘peering process,’ messages posted on one Usenet server can 
automatically propagate to other Usenet servers, which then propagate the messages to another Usenet 
server, and so on.”  Giganews, 847 F.3d at 663.  The district court in Napster held:  “If a user sets the 
‘allowable uploads’ function of the MusicShare software above zero, all of the MP3 file names she stores 
in her user library automatically become available to other online Napster users.”  A & M Records, Inc. 
v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 905 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (emphasis added).  That trial court decision 
holding Napster liable was largely affirmed on appeal:  “The form is then transmitted to a Napster server 
and automatically compared to the MP3 file names listed in the server’s search index.  Napster’s server 
compiles a list of all MP3 file names pulled from the search index which include the same search terms 
entered on the search form and transmits the list to the searching user.”  A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 
239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).   
 145. The district court decision just cited held Napster culpable of copyright infringement, and the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed that aspect.  As to the trial court ruling barring Napster from eligibility for a safe 
harbor defense, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that “significant questions” existed under this 
statute, including:  “(1) whether Napster is an Internet service provider as defined by 17 U.S.C. § 512(d); 
(2) whether copyright owners must give a service provider ‘official’ notice of infringing activity in order 
for it to have knowledge or awareness of infringing activity on its system; and (3) whether Napster 
complies with § 512(i) . . . .”  Napster, 239 F.3d at 1025. 
 146. On the display right, Giganews noted, “The evidence before us shows only that Giganews’s 
actions were akin to . . . automatically copying, storing, and transmitting materials upon instigation by 
others.”  847 F.3d at 668.  On the distribution right:  “Again, there is no indication that the distribution 
does not happen automatically.”  Id. at 669.  On the reproduction right:  “[A]utomatic copying, storage, 
and transmission of copyrighted materials, when instigated by others, does not render an Internet service 
provider strictly liable for copyright infringement.”  Id. at 670 (internal brackets omitted). 
 147. See supra note 48. 
 148. The complaint against Giganews, Inc., included a count thus denominated.  Giganews, 847 F.3d 
at 673–76. 
 149. Religious Tech. Ctr. V. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. 
Cal. 1995). 
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without permission.”150  How much is that?  The entire collection of the Library of 
Congress contains around ten terabytes.151  It thus seems safe to compute that 
unlawful access to 25,000 terabytes of copyrighted materials exceeds the sum total 
of material at issue in every single copyright infringement case ever filed from 
passage of the Statute of Anne in 1710 through Judge Whyte’s 1995 ruling. 
Now let us add into the equation Netcom element (7) addressing contributory 
infringement:152  Adverting to Sega v. MAPHIA, Judge Whyte approved the ruling 
that “a BBS operator is liable for copyright infringement where it solicited 
subscribers to upload files containing copyrighted materials to the BBS that were 
available for others to download” especially when it “received consideration for the 
right to download files.”153  With respect to the BBS defendant,154 he held, “Nothing 
in or attached to the complaint states that Klemesrud in any way profits from 
allowing Erlich to infringe copyrights.  Plaintiffs are given 30 days leave in which to 
amend to cure this pleadings deficiency if they can do so in good faith.”155  It 
therefore becomes highly relevant to note that the complaint against Giganews, Inc., 
the OSP parallel to Klemesrud,156 affirmatively sets forth the decisive allegation 
missing from that earlier case:  “Defendants’ ability to generate revenue is based 
almost exclusively on demand for the pirated works contained in the alt.binaries* 
newsgroups.”157 
Equally pertinent is that Giganews, Inc., explicitly advertised “that it does not 
keep track of subscriber downloads, effectively encouraging infringement.”158  The 
precise reason that Judge Whyte found the complaint inadequate against the OSP 
defendant in the earlier case vouchsafes the adequacy of Perfect 10’s complaint 
against the OSP in the later one.  Dismissal of the complaint against Giganews, Inc., 
 
 150. Giganews, 847 F.3d at 672 (emphasis added). 
 151. See Library of Congress, WIKIPEDIA, https://perma.cc/9EL9-DM5Z (last visited Aug. 21, 
2019).  Even if that estimate, which dates back to 2000, is an order of magnitude too small, the contrast 
with 25,000 still remains massively disproportionate. 
 152. The complaint against Giganews, Inc., included a count thus denominated.  Giganews, 847 F.3d 
at 670–73. 
 153. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1371. 
 154. It should be recalled that the plaintiff in that earlier case sued not only ISP Netcom but also 
OSP Klemesrud, who operated a BBS.  See supra Part I.A . 
 155. Netcom, 907 F. Supp. at 1382. 
 156. In Giganews, the plaintiffs failed to target the ISP, which would have been parallel to Netcom, 
Inc.  
 157. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., No. CV11–07098, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71349, at *6 (C.D. 
Cal. Mar. 8, 2013).  “Plaintiff has pleaded that it owns the copyrights to more than 165,000 images that 
Defendants have sold and distributed through their service.”  Id. at *14.  In Giganews, alt.binaries* played 
a comparable role to alt.religion.scientology in the 1995 case as the locus of alleged copyright 
infringement.  See supra Part I.A. 
 158. Giganews, 847 F.3d at 672.  The district court noted that “Perfect 10’s evidence [showed] that 
the Usenet is awash in copyrighted material” and that “staggering amounts of copyrighted works owned 
by movie producers and television networks are available on Giganews’ servers.”  Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Giganews, Inc., No. CV11–07098, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183590, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2014).  
Amazingly, it applied the defendant’s massive illegality against the plaintiff copyright owners, given that 
the amount of its own copyrighted works that were infringed was relatively minor by comparison.  Id.  
That logic is erroneous, as the Ninth Circuit later explicated.  See Glacier Films (USA), Inc. v. Turchin, 
896 F.3d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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was therefore erroneous. 
This is not to say that Giganews, Inc., itself inexorably should have been held 
liable, had the matter proceeded to trial.  The point, instead, is that the crux of its 
responsibility should have been determined based on the vehicle that Congress set 
up for that purpose:  namely, the storage safe harbor set forth in § 512.  The Ninth 
Circuit elided that discussion by rooting its holding in a misguided application of 
volition. 
B. VHT V. ZILLOW GROUP 
In the interim, the Ninth Circuit compounded the disconnect between its 
jurisprudence and the strictures enacted by Congress.  In VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Group, 
Inc., the defendant website afforded access to copyrighted images of homes for 
sale.159  The plaintiff sent the defendant “a takedown notice letter with a list of 
thousands of allegedly infringing photos by residential street address (but not by web 
address).”160  That status arises out of the § 512 framework.  A takedown notice, 
once validly served, requires the service provider to “respond[] expeditiously to 
remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing,” if it wishes 
to retain its eligibility under the safe harbor.161  However, that takedown notice itself 
must contain specified elements, including “information reasonably sufficient to 
permit the service provider to locate the material.”162  In this case, a live issue could 
arise under § 512 whether the takedown notice was rendered invalid by virtue of its 
lack of web addresses. 
When takedown notices are invalid, then the statute treats them as a complete 
nullity—which, in this case, would afford Zillow protection under the safe harbor 
even if it threw those notices in the trash and never responded to VHT.163  By 
contrast, if the notices were valid, then Zillow had the obligation to take the material 
down to maintain its eligibility for the safe harbor, regardless of whether the 
copyright owner responded to, or ignored, further inquiries.  An intermediate level is 
also possible—if the takedown notice were deemed partially compliant, a further 
inquiry could be posed whether the Copyright Act places on the service provider the 
obligation to offer an opportunity to cure.164  In this way and a host of others,165 the 
statute minutely regulates how copyright owners are supposed to respond to 
infringement of their works online by serving takedown notices and the method by 
which online service providers can avoid liability to those owners (except for limited 
injunctive relief) by engaging in the prescribed steps of the statutory minuet in 
response to those takedown notices. 
 
 159. 918 F.3d 723 (9th Cir. 2019).  The facts mirror those underlying CoStar. 
 160. Id. at 734.   
 161. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2018).  
 162. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2018).   
 163. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(i) (2018). 
 164. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(B)(ii) (2018). 
 165. For instance, the safe harbor is forfeited if the online service provider fails to appoint an agent 
for service of takedown notices.  See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (2018).  We will see that circumstance in the 
case discussed below.  See infra Part VI.C. 
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How did the Ninth Circuit analyze the situation in this case?  Incredibly, its 
opinion never even mentions § 512, with all its elaborate specifications about 
takedown notices.  Instead, the court reasoned from general principles as to how 
parties should comport themselves when they send and receive takedown notices.  
The opinion recites that Zillow responded to the takedown notice by requesting that 
VHT furnish it with executed license agreements.166  It then continues: “Instead of 
responding with the contracts, VHT filed suit.  Zillow’s reasonable response to 
VHT’s single formal inquiry (supplemented in a follow-on email) can hardly be 
characterized as rising to the level of volitional conduct or turning a blind eye.”167  
This ruling relies on Giganews to hold non-volitional, and hence immune, an online 
provider that promulgated “copyright-protective ‘trumping’ rules” and also, once 
apprised of infringement, “took affirmative action to address the claims.”168 
The foregoing logic might hold water in the absence of legislation.  But it ignores 
the actual scheme that Congress adopted in this domain.  Rather than looking to the 
statutory language to determine the effect of an absence of web addresses, the court 
wove out of whole cloth a requirement to identify “the URL for each image.”169  It 
also contravenes the statutory scheme to hold that service provider defendants may 
put plaintiffs who have served valid takedown notices to the burden of furnishing 
background contractual entitlements, and that the failure to produce such 
entitlements material immunizes the defendant as having behaved “non-
volitionally.” 
Even though the jury had found the defendant culpable for contributory 
infringement, the Ninth Circuit rejected that verdict.  Its basis was that “Zillow did 
not have appropriately ‘specific’ information necessary to take ‘simple measures’ to 
remedy the violation.”170  Whence did it derive that standard?  The case quotes the 
“simple measures” requirement from Giganews, tracing it back to Netcom.171  But 
the supreme law of the land is not what was set forth in a 1995 district court opinion.  
Violation of copyright is not resolved based on that early case’s pronouncements 
about either “simple measures” or “volition.” 
Nonetheless, there is one respect in which this case is fundamentally dissimilar 
from Giganews.  That earlier ruling entirely exonerated its defendant, who even 
recovered its attorney’s fees as the prevailing party.172  By contrast, a separate part 
of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in this later instance upheld summary judgment against 
Zillow for infringing almost 4,000 photos, with concomitant liability for statutory 
damages.173  At the end of the day, therefore, VHT recovered significant damages—
very much in contrast to the denial of all relief to Perfect 10. 
 
 166. VHT, Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 723, 734 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 167. Id. at 734. 
 168. Id. at 733–34. 
 169. Id. at 745. 
 170. Id. at 745. 
 171. Id. at 745; see also supra note 14.  
 172. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 F.3d 657, 674–76 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 173. The case absolved defendant of direct infringement with respect to photos displayed on its 
listing platform.  Zillow, 918 F.3d at 734.  By contrast, when Zillow moderators tagged individual photos, 
its efforts rendered it volitional and liable for displayed, searchable photos.  Id. at 736, 738–44. 
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C. BWP MEDIA USA V. T & S SOFTWARE ASSOCIATES 
Two months after Giganews, a similar issue arose before the Fifth Circuit.  This 
time, though, § 512 was front and center:  In BWP Media USA, Inc. v. T & S Software 
Assocs., Inc., the defendant failed to designate an agent to receive takedown notices 
for material on its HairTalk website.174  Accordingly, it forfeited any right to the safe 
harbor.175  The entire case therefore turned on background doctrines of copyright 
infringement jurisprudence.  The court chose to resolve it on the basis of volition. 
The Fifth Circuit began its opinion by quoting the same treatise passage rooting 
volition not in an “act of willing or choosing” but instead as an inquiry into proximate 
causation.176  Like Giganews, it ruled on the basis of Justice Scalia’s dissent and 
Netcom.177  But it at least recognized the tension between that 1995 case and 
Congress’ later adoption of § 512.178  Yet it rejected plaintiff’s position that 
“adopting the volitional-conduct requirement would render Section 512(c)’s safe 
harbor meaningless.”179  It did so on two bases:  by reference to a paragraph of § 512 
entitled “Other Defenses Not Affected” and in reliance on CoStar. 
Let us consider each in turn.  The statutory paragraph in question mandates that 
failure “to qualify for limitation of liability under this section shall not bear adversely 
upon the consideration of a defense by the service provider that the service provider’s 
conduct is not infringing under this title or any other defense.”180  To illustrate via a 
famous case, when Google declined to respond to Cindy Garcia’s takedown notices 
regarding Innocence of Muslims, it forfeited the safe harbor—but it was still able to 
prevail based on other defenses, such as a failure of the plaintiff to prove that her 
copyright interest in the work in question had been infringed.181 
Sticking to the subject of volition, let us return to the hacker who carved out space 
in a company’s intranet to make it available for third party infringement, all without 
the company’s knowledge.182  That company would have had no reason to designate 
an agent to receive notifications of infringement, and thus would have been as bereft 
as HairTalk of any § 512 safe harbor.  Nonetheless, a court could validly conclude 
that the company failed to act volitionally, given that the hack into its premises broke 
the chain of proximate causation.  As such, it could still prevail as defendant, as the 
quoted statutory paragraph mandates. 
Nonetheless, it does violence to that paragraph of § 512 to conclude that the 
Copyright Act provides immunity to essentially all actors who respond 
 
 174. 852 F.3d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 175. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (2018). 
 176. T & S Software, 852 F.3d at 440 n.1 (quoting Giganews, 847 F.3d at 666 (quoting NIMMER ON 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 30, § 13.08[C])). 
 177. Id. at 441–42. 
 178. Id. at 442. 
 179. Id. at 443. 
 180. 17 U.S.C. § 512(l) (2018).  
 181. See Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).  For an extended analysis 
of this case, see David Nimmer, Innocence of Copyright: An Inquiry into the Public Interest, 63 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 367 (2016). 
 182. See supra Intermezzo. 
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“automatically” to user requests.  That interpretation renders the safe harbor as a 
whole largely otiose, for the reasons explored at length above.183 
What remains is the Fourth Circuit’s CoStar holding.  That case held liable for 
copyright infringement only the human actor who effectively “pushed the button”—
a stance that Justice Breyer emphatically rejected in Aereo.184  Both bases for 
exonerating the website in this case therefore evaporate. 
VII. THE CORRECT PATH FORWARD 
A. SPANSKI ENTERPRISES V. TELEWIZJA POLSKA 
In Spanski Enterprises, Inc. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A., the plaintiff licensed 
American broadcasting rights in content produced by the defendant, Poland’s 
national public broadcaster.185  To protect the plaintiff’s rights, the defendant made 
its programming available on its website’s video-on-demand feature only subject to 
geoblocking preventing access in the United States.186  Yet the defendant then 
intentionally disabled that geoblocking as to over fifty episodes,187 causing the 
district court to hold it a willful infringer liable for over three million dollars in 
statutory damages.188 
On appeal, the defendant challenged the determination of volitional conduct.  
There was both a factual and legal component.  As to the former, the evidence was 
insufficient to dislodge the factual finding that one of the defendant’s employees 
engaged in “a volitional step . . . to give access” by disabling the blocking.189  
Turning to the legal dimension, the defendant urged the proposition adopted by sister 
circuits that: 
[V]olitional conduct is absent where, as here, a website owner “operates an automatic 
content delivery system that is not itself infringing, the user, not the website owner, 
selects the content it will view or receive and actuates the delivery system, and the user 
request is not processed by the website owner’s employees.”190 
Judge Tatel properly concluded that this argument “cannot be squared with the text 
 
 183. See supra Part II.C and note 48. 
 184. The Supreme Court styled the plaintiffs’ burden as:  “[T]he Networks must prove that Aereo 
‘perform[s]’ copyrighted works, §106(4), when its subscribers log in, select a channel, and push the 
‘watch’ button.”  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 453 (2014).  The majority’s decision 
against Aereo, Inc., proves that liability extends past the individual who actually pushes the button. 
 185. 883 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 186. Id. (“[D]efault territorial access setting assigned to each TVP Polonia episode in the Content 
Management System was ‘minus America . . . .’”). 
 187. See Spanski Enters., Inc. v. Telewizja Polska S.A., 222 F. Supp. 3d 95, 107–08 (D.D.C. 2016), 
aff’d, 883 F.3d 904 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 188. Spanski Enters., 883 F.3d at 909.   
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 910 (omitting brackets added by the Second Circuit) (quoting Appellant’s Brief at 25).  
That page of the brief first cites Giganews, then derives the quoted standard from a previous case on which 
Giganews relied:  namely, Fox Broad. Co. v. Dish Network L.L.C., 747 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013).  See 
supra note 118. 
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of the Copyright Act.”191  The Act nowhere limits infringing performances to those 
in which “a third-party end user plays no role in the showing.”192 
Moving beyond the text, the case held that Aereo “forecloses TV Polska’s 
argument that the automated nature of its video-on-demand system or the end user’s 
role in selecting which content to access insulates it from Copyright Act liability.”193  
The D.C. Circuit rejected purported distinctions from Aereo that were based on:  (1) 
defendant’s own role in creating the content in issue, given that it licensed that 
content to plaintiff;194 and (2) an attempt to cabin Justice Breyer’s interpretation in 
that ruling into “a one-time deal, good for that case only.”195  Aereo, Inc.’s 
overwhelming resemblance to cable retransmission in no way diminished the Court’s 
pronouncements in that case from “establish[ing] precedential principles that apply 
to materially similar factual scenarios arising in future cases,” such as this one.196 
At that point, defendant launched its parade of horribles about limitless liability 
threatening YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, T-Mobile, and others.197  The court 
responded with exactly the right consideration:  “Congress has already provided 
statutory protection against some of these potential ramifications.  See 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512 (providing statutory defenses for service providers charged with 
infringement).”198  It is precisely in the realm of that statutory safe harbor that 
qualifying services can escape liability under the law—at the same time that those 
who fail to comply are held responsible for their conduct.199  Congress enacted the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act as a compromise between competing interests; 
this decision gives content to that enactment. 
B. BWP MEDIA USA V. POLYVORE 
1. Concurrences Only 
In 2019, the Second Circuit returned to the same domain that it had repeatedly 
addressed prior to the Supreme Court’s Aereo reversal.  In BWP Media USA Inc. v. 
Polyvore, Inc., the defendant ran a website that allowed users “to create and share 
 
 191. Spanski Enters., 883 F.3d at 910. 
 192. Id.  As emphasized in the critiques above of Giganews and T & S Software, whether third parties 
themselves take affirmative steps to commit copyright infringement cannot decrease the liability of 
defendant online service providers through whose instrumentality individuals may obtain copyrighted 
works. 
 193. Id. at 911. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id.  The defendant’s argument, based on language in Aereo reserving decision on how its 
resolution would apply to “other cases involving different kinds of service or technology,” was so 
fundamentally wrong that “every first-year law student” would spot its error.  Id. 
 196. Id.  
 197. Id. at 912. 
 198. Id. 
 199. The opinion then cites cases from Netcom to T & S Software with the observation, “[o]ur court 
has yet to decide whether to read such a volitional conduct or proximate cause requirement into the 
Copyright Act, and we need not do so today.”  Id.  
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digital photo collages devoted to fashion, art, and design.”200  Uploaded images 
triggered technical processes that resulted in their being displayed automatically.201  
Among the 118 million images thus made available, the plaintiff claimed 
infringement of celebrity photographs that it owned.202  After the trial court had 
granted summary judgment against the plaintiff based on lack of volition on the 
defendant’s part,203 the Second Circuit reversed per curiam.204  Each judge on the 
panel issued a separate opinion concurring in the result,205 collectively containing 
over one hundred references to “volition.” 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the land.206  But, as shown above, in the 
context of volition in copyright cases, Judge Whyte’s 1995 pronouncement in district 
court has effectively gained that exalted status—including in circuit court language 
in 2018, as noted above.207  Part of this 2019 opinion continues the trend—Judge 
Walker’s concurrence parses the fine points of Netcom’s language to give 
independent content to both components of “volition or causation.”208 
More globally, Judge Walker returned to Cablevision (which he had authored)209 
in order to confront its continued vitality after the Supreme Court’s Aereo reversal.210  
Characterizing the Supreme Court majority’s opinion as “confined to the discrete 
area of television rebroadcasting,”211 he concluded that “Aereo did nothing to disturb 
Cablevision’s volitional conduct requirement and that requirement continues to 
apply to cases involving ISPs.”212  Based on Cablevision, he opined that “an ISP does 
not act volitionally when it automatically makes a single copy of content selected by 
 
 200. 922 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2019) (Walker, J., concurring in the result). 
 201. Id. at 45 (“All posted images were displayed automatically by software—meaning Polyvore 
employees did not review or interact with user-posted images before they appeared on the site.”). 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 46. 
 204. After a single paragraph setting forth conclusions, each of the three panel members issued an 
opinion “concurring in the result.”  It should be added that the precise basis for reversal was a dispute over 
issues of material fact as to “whether Polyvore created multiple copies of BWP’s photos that were not 
requested by Polyvore users.”  Id. at 44 (per curiam). 
 205. One opinion was very short, so will not be treated herein.  See id. at 69 (Pooler, J., concurring 
in the result).  In brief, it rejected “conceptualizing volitional conduct in such a way that an ISP does not 
act volitionally when it automatically makes one, but not more than one, unrequested copy in response to 
a user’s request for a copy.”  Id. 
 206. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
 207. See supra text accompanying note 171. 
 208. Polyvore, 922 F.3d at 52 (Walker, J. concurring) (“When the district court in Netcom referred 
to ‘volition or causation’ in stating how direct liability might be limited ‘where a defendant’s system is 
merely used to create a copy by a third party’ . . . I think it was positing two possibilities, not one.”) (citing 
Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 
1995)). 
 209.  He took this occasion to correct use of the term “element” in that earlier opinion.  Id. at 48 n.4 
(“I agree that volitional conduct is not an element of a cause of action for direct liability, but rather a 
factual component that must be established when the identity of the infringer is in doubt.”).   
 210. Id. at 48–49. 
 211. Id. at 49.  This sensibility corresponds to the argument, rejected by Judge Tatel, that Aereo was 
“a one-time deal, good for that case only.”  Spanski Enters. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A., 883 F.3d 904, 911 
(D.C. Cir. 2018).  See supra text accompanying note 195. 
 212. Polyvore, 922 F.3d at 49. 
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the user in response to a user’s request.”213 
Judge Newman disagreed on both counts.  Instead of giving separate content to 
“volition” and “causation,” his concurrence followed the treatise perspective 
interpreting Netcom’s use of both those terms to refer the unremarkable principle that 
proximate causation is required in copyright cases.214  He therefore parted company 
with Judge Walker’s defense of Cablevision.  In particular, he questioned the 
statement in that earlier case:  “In determining who actually ‘makes’ a copy, a 
significant difference exists between making a request to a human employee, who 
then volitionally operates the copying system to make the copy, and issuing a 
command directly to a system, which automatically obeys commands and engages 
in no volitional conduct.”215  His concurrence rejected Cablevision’s ruling that only 
the human being who operates a copying system accrues liability, with the 
consequence of immunizing an entity that designs or operates a system to make 
copies by automatically obeying the commands of others.216  Instead, consonant with 
Justice Breyer’s recognition of “both/and” liability in this sphere, Judge Newman 
raised the possibility of joint liability for “the developer or operator of a system, 
activated automatically by a user” along with that user.217 
2. Precedential Value of Cablevision 
Where does the foregoing disagreement leave Cablevision?  If it wanted to, 
Congress certainly had the power to specify different levels of volition with respect 
to different technologies.  It could have required, for instance, negligence to infringe 
photographs, recklessness to infringe novels, and willfulness to infringe television 
programs.  But Congress manifestly employed no such distinctions when enacting 
the 1976 Act. 
Can one read the Supreme Court’s ruling to reflect an interpretation of the Act 
that Congress intended a generally applicable “volition” requirement, which it then 
specifically waived in the context of television programs?  That hypothetical stance 
would reconcile the holding in Aereo with a still-extant “volition” requirement 
elsewhere.  But, to draw that distinction, proponents would need to root its basis in 
the statutory text or at least the legislative history of the Act.  They have pointed to 
none, so this conceivable basis evaporates in the light of the Court’s actual ruling.218  
 
 213. Id. at 50.  Nonetheless, he concluded that a question of material fact existed “whether Polyvore, 
separate from its users, acted volitionally by making and displaying the additional copies of BWP’s 
images.”  Id. at 52. 
 214. Id. at 62 (Newman, J., concurring); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 30, 
§ 13.08[C][1]. 
 215. Polyvore, 922 F.3d at 65–66 (quoting Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 
(Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2008)) (emphasis by Judge Newman).  
 216. Id. at 65.  That incorrect approach reflected Second Circuit law from the divided panel’s ruling 
in Aereo, until checked by the Supreme Court’s reversal.  Id.  Nonetheless, “the status of systems that 
automatically caused an infringement at a customer’s command remained uncertain because the Supreme 
Court’s majority opinion said nothing about volition or causation.”  Id. 
 217. Id. at 66. 
 218. After discarding a blanket rule immunizing service providers who provide access in automatic 
response to user requests, the discussion above recognized that it was still possible that there could be an 
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Justice Breyer examined the conduct of Aereo, Inc., to determine whether it was a 
direct infringer and reached an affirmative conclusion.  The Supreme Court ruled the 
defendant in violation of copyright law for conduct that unfolded “in automatic 
response” to user requests.  Judge Newman therefore properly applied that ruling to 
debunk the Second Circuit’s earlier categorical rulings.219 
At the same time, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Aereo that “[i]n other cases 
involving different kinds of service or technology providers, a user’s involvement in 
the operation of the provider’s equipment and selection of the content transmitted 
may well bear on whether the provider performs within the meaning of the 
Act.”220  That recognition in no way implies that a different volition standard applies 
to the public performance of television programming than would apply in all other 
instances221—to the reproduction of literary works such as Hubbard’s writings, for 
example.222  It simply recognizes the universally applicable phenomenon that 
different facts could attract a different result.223 
Moreover, even if the Aereo ruling could somehow be cabined into solely the 
context of similarity between the defendant and a cable provider of television 
programming, that limitation would still doom the Cablevision ruling.  For 
Cablevision, Inc., was itself a cable provider, whereas Aereo, Inc., was not (it used 
the Internet).224  Any disqualification of Aereo, Inc., therefore applies a fortiori to 
Cablevision, Inc.  No matter how one slices it, the Supreme Court majority opinion 
leaves no room to vindicate the Second Circuit’s Cablevision ruling exonerating the 
 
implicit rule in the Copyright Act that applies in certain instances, which service providers could invoke 
in concrete cases to avoid liability when they respond “automatically” to user requests.  See supra note 
123.  On examination, we now see that even that lesser standard is lacking.   
 219. See supra Part VII.B.1.   
 220. Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 431, 444 (2014).  For instance, if a company rented 
a channel over digital fiber to allow physics researchers to send a high-speed data burst of the sender’s 
choosing to other universities, it is possible that there would be no liability for copyright infringement 
even if an individual customer abused the service to send an infringing television show over the fiber to a 
non-university target.  That entity might be simply an equipment supplier.  See supra Intermezzo 
(hypothetical about corporate intranet).  
 221. As other commentators note, the majority’s search into the history of cable television “does not 
warrant a negative inference that different providers in different contexts do not perform.”  Giblin & 
Ginsburg, supra note 109, at 129.  
 222. The majority declined to limit its rulings to the particulars of cable television technology.  
Indeed, Justice Breyer rejected the dissent’s claimed “critical difference” between Aereo, Inc., and 
traditional cable systems:  namely, its claim “that Aereo’s subscribers, not Aereo, ‘select the copyrighted 
content’ that is ‘performed,’ and for that reason they, not Aereo, ‘transmit’ the performance.”  Aereo, 573 
U.S. at 443 (as altered by Justice Breyer, omitting his brackets).  Regardless of conceded differences, the 
Court upheld liability.  
 223. To reiterate Judge Tatel’s observation, “as every first-year law student learns, a judicial 
decision resolves only the case before it, so it is unsurprising that the Court declined to hypothesize about 
how its holding would apply to future cases.”  Spanski Enters. v. Telewizja Polska, S.A., 883 F.3d 904, 
911 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 224. After losing at the Supreme Court level, Aereo, Inc., along with other companies similarly 
situated, belatedly tried to qualify under the cable compulsory license.  Their efforts failed.  See Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller, LLC, 851 F.3d 1002, 1015 (9th Cir. 2017); Fox Television 
Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC, 150 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6–7 (D.D.C. 2015); Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 
112 U.S.P.Q.2d 1582, 1585–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); FilmOn X, LLC v. Window to the World Commc’ns, 
Inc., 118 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001, 1113 n.14 (N.D. Ill. 2016). 
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defendant on the basis that only its button-pushing users are culpable of copyright 
infringement.  That holding can no longer stand, given the Supreme Court’s rejection 
of its logic in its follow-on Aereo decision. 
Nonetheless, it does not follow that Cablevision, Inc., would ineluctably lose if it 
went to a full trial on the merits under currently governing law.  As already noted, 
the company’s RS-DVR in that case was a digital successor to the analog Sony 
Betamax, which the Supreme Court determined to be non-infringing based on 
doctrines that stood outside the Second Circuit’s purview in the later case.225  
Although the opinion was mistaken to exonerate Cablevision, Inc., based on its 
putative absence of volition, the resolution remains possible that it would ultimately 
prevail if all legal doctrines pertinent to its conduct were addressed.  For instance, at 
the end of the day, the company might be able to establish an affirmative defense226 
such as fair use227 or the absence of a different aspect of the plaintiff’s prima facie 
case, such as the public aspect228 of public performance.229 
 
 225. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434–42, 447–56 (1984); see 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 478 F. Supp. 607, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), 
rev’d sub nom., Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 226. As a matter of terminology, confusion has arisen whether fair use should be labeled an 
“affirmative defense.”  See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting 
that “labeling it as an affirmative defense that excuses conduct is a misnomer”); Disney Enters. v. 
VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[I]f the Studios demonstrated a likelihood of success 
on their copyright infringement and DMCA claims, the burden shifted to VidAngel to show a likelihood 
of success on its FMA and fair use affirmative defenses.”).  That debate over terminology is immaterial 
to current concerns. 
 227. Indeed, Judge Newman has adopted that rationale, accepting the holding of Cablevision, which 
he viewed as rooted in time-shifting.  BWP Media USA, Inc. v. Polyvore, Inc., 922 F.3d 42, 64 (quoting 
Cablevision, 536 F.3d at 123).  That aspect traces back to Sony.  See Sony, 464 U.S. at 434–42, 447–56; 
Twentieth Century Fox Film, 478 F. Supp. at 616.  Judge Newman relied on “a thorough and enlightening 
analysis of the Sony decision.”  Polyvore, 922 F.3d at 63 (citing Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, 
Unwinding Sony, 95 CAL. L. REV. 941 (2007)). 
 228. To prevail under 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2018), the plaintiff must show that the defendant (a) 
performed the work in question and (b) did so publicly.  See supra Part V.A.  The Aereo Supreme Court 
majority addressed volition under prong (a).  It then invoked prong (b) to contrast car dealers with parking 
valets, the former acting publicly and the latter privately.  See Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 573 U.S. 
431, 448–49 (2014). 
 229. Indeed, this writer has highlighted that rationale, based on an elaborate search into how the 
contrast between dealers and valets plays out in the copyright context.  To telescope the matter, viewers 
who pressed Aereo’s app button had no prior relationship to the content in question, thus rendering that 
company liable.  By contrast, viewers who pressed Cablevision’s remote-control button did have that prior 
relationship to the content, by virtue of the license that the plaintiffs had granted to Cablevision to provide 
their programming to those viewers.  The result in Cablevision is to view its dissemination as 
noninfringing, by analogy to parking valets.  See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 30,  
§ 8.14[C][3][c][iii][II].  That stance is not altogether different from another commentator’s: 
If an owner operates a website that offers unauthorized downloads of popular music, we would 
have little hesitation in holding the owner directly liable for the reproduction and distribution that 
occurs when a user clicks on the download button.  The fact that the infringement was initiated by 
the actions of the customer seems insufficient to protect the owner from liability. . . . However, 
when it is the owner who uses the copier or who selects the works available for downloading from 
its website, the reproduction of those specific works is more clearly connected to the owner’s 
actions.  The volition requirement in copyright law defines the connection between the owner of 
a copying system and the copied work that is sufficient to justify attributing the copying of that 
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In any event, we can now appreciate that the circuit court decisions discussed 
above, 230 which recognized a volition defense, failed to grapple with the full panoply 
of issues that Judges Tatel and Newman have more recently brought to the fore. 231  
Those former decisions are now ripe for reconsideration even within the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits.  Plus, the Second Circuit’s recent divided panel ruling makes it 
particularly appropriate for that court to disaffirm Cablevision explicitly. 
FINALE:  THE FUTURE OF CAUSATION 
We have seen above scenarios in which proximate causation could qualify 
as a viable defense.232  But those hypotheticals about earthquakes and vandals 
are highly strained.  The absence of any real-world decision on point during the 
past two and a quarter centuries renders the matter of much more theoretical 
than practical significance. 
One may project the passage of future centuries without scenarios such as 
the above actually being litigated.  Instead, Aereo answers the questions that 
are likely to arise regarding proximate causation by establishing a bright line in 
this regard.  Entities, such as Aereo, Inc., and Cablevision, Inc., which engineer 
complex systems and purvey associated machinery to pick up copyrighted 
broadcasts through the mere push of a button on a remote or app, in turn 
connected to the machinery that defendant itself maintains at the head-end, 
cannot escape liability by deflecting all responsibility onto the individuals who 
push those buttons.  Rather, to the extent that they would avoid being tarred as 
infringers, those purveyors must establish a different defense.233 
That ruling achieves parity between copyright plaintiffs and defendants.  On 
the former side, one qualifies as an “author” of copyrightable content by 
performing the intellectual labor of composition, rather than by pressing the 
buttons to affix the subject work in a tangible medium of expression.  For that 
reason, a bestselling novelist who dictates, rather than the stenographer who 
transcribes, qualifies as the copyright proprietor—and even a paralyzed 
individual who directs underlings how to carve may qualify as the sculptor whom 
the Copyright Act recognizes as author.234  On the latter side,235 Cablevision’s 
“author of copyright infringement”236 should equally attach to the entity that 
 
work to the owner.  
Denicola, supra note 83, at 1271–72.  For yet a different perspective for how to evaluate these types of 
services post-Aereo, see Giblin & Ginsburg, supra note 109, at 134–39. 
 230. See supra part VI. 
 231. See supra parts VII.A, VII.B.1. 
 232. See supra Intermezzo. 
 233. Some examples are discussed above.  See supra notes 227, 229. 
 234. See Fisher v. Klein, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1795, 1796 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 235. When investigating authorship, we discover similar puzzles in causation as have been explored 
above regarding copying:  “[C]opyright law chooses to address the question of causation only indirectly 
(and begrudgingly).”  Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Causing Copyright, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017).  
 236. Recall that the phrase “the author of an allegedly infringing instance of reproduction” traces 
back to the Second Circuit’s Cablevision opinion.  Cartoon Network, LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 
(Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121, 131 (2d Cir. 2008).  See supra Part IV.A.  
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performs the intellectual labor of engineering the copying, rather than being 
limited to the final individual who happens to press the button.237  The Supreme 
Court’s Aereo ruling brings sanity to the legal scheme by focusing the law’s 
attention on the company that spent millions investing in infrastructure and 
equipment designed to allow exploitation of copyrighted material by members 
of the public, rather than on miscellaneous customers who happen to push 
buttons or spin knobs.238 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In 1976, Congress included in the current Copyright Act a provision aimed at 
carriers “whose activities with respect to the secondary transmission consist solely 
of providing wires, cables, or other communications channels for the use of 
others.”239  Absent inclusion of special language defining their conduct as “not an 
infringement of copyright,”240 general principles would have held those passive 
carriers liable.241  In 1998, Congress updated the Act to accord the same status to 
evolving technology.  Its amendment that year recognized that, under the architecture 
of the Internet, “service providers must engage in all kinds of acts that expose them 
to potential copyright infringement liability” such as by “directing users to sites in 
response to inquiries by users,” given that those “sites might contain infringing 
material.”242  It responded “by limiting the liability of service providers”243 in four 
particulars in which they would be liable in the absence of these new safe harbors, 
including “by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides 
on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the storage provider.”244 
In so acting, Congress considered various proposals, including one that would 
have codified a 1995 district court decision immunizing systems acting 
“automatically.”245  One bill then under consideration furnished immunity whenever 
“the storage and transmission is carried out through an automatic technological 
process, without any selection of that material by the provider.”246  Congress 
expressly rejected that solution. 
 
 237. Many copyright decisions have confronted the issue of joint authorship.  See Childress v. 
Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 501–09 (2d Cir. 1991) (Newman, J.).  The question at present falls on the opposite 
side of the ledger, looking to joint liability.  BWP Media USA, Inc. v. Polyvore, Inc., 922 F.3d 42, 66, 69 
(Newman, J., concurring) (in the absence of established “clear principles for determining when the 
developer or operator of a system, activated automatically by a user, is jointly liable with the user for 
direct infringement,” remanding to determine “whether Polyvore’s system crosses the line”). 
 238. As the Supreme Court majority noted, “Here the signals pursue their ordinary course of travel 
through the universe until today’s ‘turn of the knob’—a click on a Website—activates machinery that 
intercepts and reroutes them to Aereo’s subscribers over the Internet.”  Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 
573 U.S. 431, 444 (2014). 
 239. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (2018).  
 240. 17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (2018). 
 241. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 242. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998); see also supra text accompanying note 59. 
 243. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998); see also supra text accompanying note 59. 
 244. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2018). 
 245. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 246. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
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Notwithstanding explicit rejection of that early district court decision, rendered at 
the outset of the Internet era when copyright infringement was sparse and before 
Congress had a chance to craft its preferred solution, circuit court decisions over the 
past several years have treated that 1995 opinion as some sort of basic law whose 
every locution must be parsed and followed.247  In particular, they have picked up on 
its stray reference to “volition”248 as a basis to propagate immunity for services that 
respond to user requests “automatically.”249  That approach not only violates the 
proper method to determine copyright violations, but also contravenes the Supreme 
Court’s 2014 resolution of a copyright infringement case holding an online service 
provider in violation by virtue of affording access to copyrighted material  “in 
automatic response” to user requests.250  Given that the volume of infringing material 
has increased from a trickle in 1995 to the deluge confronted in those opinions, their 
approach is singularly inappropriate.251 
Happily, other circuit court authority has inclined in the opposite direction.  Judge 
Tatel, speaking for the District of Columbia Circuit, along with Judge Newman, 
concurring in a Second Circuit decision, have illuminated the way forward.  Their 
opinions light the way towards a day when massive copyright violations are held to 
legal standards and defendants will no longer be able to evade responsibility under 
the tattered banner of “volition.” 
 
 
 247. See examples set forth supra text accompanying notes 171, 208. 
 248. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
 249. See the three cases discussed supra Part VI. 
 250. See supra text accompanying note 132. 
 251. The amount of infringement facilitated by one defendant amounted to many thousands of times 
greater than the whole contents of the Library of Congress—yet the Ninth Circuit held that defendant 
immune as a matter of law.  See supra text accompanying note 151. 
